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AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ACCIDENT RISK 
PART 1: THE LIMITS OF REALISTIC MODELLING 
 
Peter Brooker 
 
Cranfield University 
 
“Mr Casaubon's…hope in immortality seemed to lean on the immortality of the still 
unwritten Key to all Mythologies“ 
‘Middlemarch’ by George Eliot 
ABSTRACT 
The prime goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident 
risk.  Some key questions are posed, including: What do design safety targets really 
mean and imply for risk modelling?  In what circumstances can future accident risk 
really be modelled with sufficient precision?  If risk cannot be estimated with 
precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and 
operational/technical changes?  This paper endeavours to answer these questions 
by an analysis of the nature of accidents, causal factors and practical collision risk 
modelling.  The main theme is how best to combine sound safety evidence and real 
world hazard analysis in a coherent and systematic framework.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The prime goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident 
risk.  This leads to some important questions: 
What are the essential ingredients for ATM systems to be designed safely?   
How best can the lessons learned from accidents and incidents influence safe 
system design? 
What do design safety targets really mean and imply for risk modelling?   
In what circumstances can future accident risk really be modelled with 
sufficient precision?   
If risk cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured 
with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? 
 
This paper endeavours to answer these questions in a coherent and systematic 
framework by an analysis of the nature of accidents, causal factors and practical 
collision risk modelling.  The main theme is how best to combine sound safety 
evidence and real-world hazard analysis.  It is the first of two papers.  The second 
(Brooker, 2005d) applies this framework and toolkit to the important ESARR4 
document and its supporting material, first through a critique and then by an 
attempted repair of ESARR4’s methodology.  [ESARR4 is the Eurocontrol Safety 
Regulatory Requirement Number 4 (Eurocontrol SRC, 2001): ‘Risk Assessment and 
Mitigation in ATM’.]   
 
One point needs to be made in advance.  The analysis here will use some concepts 
from tort law.  It is stressed that this is used because legal analysis has some 
admirable features when adapted to safety issues: legal analyses strive for clear 
definitions and logical frameworks.  Those aspects of tort law concerned with blame 
and compensation are not relevant in any of the following, although some general 
comments are made about duty of care and safety responsibility.  The word 
‘accident’ used here just means an undesirable un-planned event, and words such 
as ‘failure’ have no connotations of blame. 
 
This paper is standalone, but in some aspects it is a companion document to earlier 
papers, in particular Brooker (2004b), which examines the use of quantitative risk 
targets, and Brooker (2005b), which focuses on learning lessons from hazardous 
incidents.   
2. WHAT IS THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SAFETY SYSTEM? 
The question ‘What is the ‘Air Traffic Management Safety System’ that provides 
Safety?’ actually covers several related questions.  These include: 
What is Air Traffic Management (ATM)? 
How is ATM different from Air Traffic Control (ATC)? 
What is meant by ‘System’ in ‘ATM System’? 
Given an ATM System, where are the responsibilities for safety? 
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How is the system designed for safety and its performance improved? 
There are probably no absolutely correct answers to these kinds of questions, but 
some kinds of answers may be more useful or more prudent than others.  The focus 
here is on the safety of commercial transport flights carrying passengers and/or 
freight receiving an ATC service, focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on mid-air 
collision risk.  The most valuable understanding of the ATM System’s characteristics 
is taken to be one that best facilitates safety improvements.   
 
‘Safety’ itself has many meanings.  Here it will be taken to be something measured 
by risk rates to people – aircraft accidents involving deaths (Brooker, 2004b).  What 
kinds of accidents are definitely not ATM System safety issues?  Three categories 
are security, aircraft flight and pilot flying: 
Security covers deaths from hijacking, sabotage and other acts of terrorism, 
where there is an intent to harm.  Obviously, the air travel system needs 
security defences, but these are additional to and distinct from safety 
defences, so risks from security failures should be assessed separately from 
aviation safety.   
Accidents arising purely from aircraft flight are those in which the aircraft 
systems fail in some catastrophic fashion.  Examples would be loss of engine 
power, major structural failure of the aircraft control surfaces or engine 
mountings, shutdown of cockpit electrical systems.  In these circumstances, 
the aircrew could probably not prevent an aircraft crash, nor would any 
intervention by ATC be likely to alleviate the situation. 
A ‘pilot flying’ accident would be one arising from aircrew action at a critical 
stage.  A pilot might mis-remember the critical aircraft speeds on takeoff and 
hence fail to get airborne.  A pilot might have a heart attack during an 
instrument approach and dive the aircraft into the ground.  Once again, no 
kind of intervention by ATC could be guaranteed to alleviate the situation. 
Aircraft flight and pilot flying are therefore aviation safety risks but not ATM System 
risks.  Thus, the categorisation of safety is as in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Differences between air travel risk categories 
ATM System 
Risks 
Security Risks 
Flight Risks 
eg aircraft flight, 
pilots’ flying 
Air travel safety 
ATM System safety 
Aviation safety 
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What is inside the ATM System safety circle above?  First, all ATC functions should 
be in the circle.  ATC has information about the likely paths of other flights, and 
therefore can pass instructions to the pilot that will ensure safe passage on taxiways, 
runways and in flight.  For present purposes, ATC covers all the activities from the 
start of a flight to its completion that involve the determination of the aircraft’s 
flightpath, including planning activities and flow management (even though some of 
these tasks could take place before the aircraft is in motion).  Some aspects of this 
may be related to scheduling operations rather than safety, but they are still 
generally held to be an ATC function.  There may some boundary definition issues, 
eg with airline operational staff and airport ground staff.  A test question might be: “Is 
the movement of the aircraft being planned, monitored or changed with the 
movement of other aircraft in mind?” 
 
As far as the aircrew are concerned, what happens ‘inside ATC’ is a black box.  The 
aircrew get instructions and, so long as they appear sensible and prudent, the 
aircrew do not care if they derive from judgements by human beings or the outputs of 
computer processing.  The aircrew know that ATC has a duty of care and is subject 
to safety regulation, so that the internal workings of ATC will make sense in safety 
terms, and hence controllers’ instructions should be obeyed. 
 
ATC is carried out by what are often termed ANSPs (Air Navigation Service 
Providers), such as National Air Traffic Services (NATS) in the UK.  ATC uses 
several kinds of technical entity: communications, navigation, surveillance (CNS), 
and data processing DP.  These are surely all part of the ATM System?  The kind of 
test questions that should be posed are: ‘Would these entities be there if the ATM 
System were not, and would the ATM System require them to be in place in order to 
deliver the levels of safety required?’   
 
Data processing (DP) links the CNS functions.  Communication systems, both air-
ground and between controllers and ATC centres, including both voice and 
electronic data transmission, are an integral part of ATC: effective ATC requires the 
controller to communicate with the pilot.  Surveillance is also now an integral part of 
ATC: radars are there so that controllers can see position information on screens.  
Without it, how could controllers do their job?   
 
Navigation is different.  Controllers do not navigate aircraft, but ANSPs do provide 
some ground aids for aircraft, while others are independent on-board systems (eg 
altimetry for vertical navigation).  But ground aids can also be provided by military 
organisations that are separate from civil ATC provision, while independent 
public/private bodies could provide satellite-based systems.  Being part of the ATM 
System does not necessarily imply anything about ownership.  So is navigation part 
of the ‘ATM System’?  Yes, it is, because it would be very difficult to run a safe 
system in any meaningful sense of the phrase if aircraft flightpaths did not match 
their ATC instructions.  If aircraft could not navigate well, mid-air collisions might be 
much more frequent.  Note that a collision attributable to a gross navigational 
equipment failure could only occur if that equipment had been deemed by providers 
and regulators to be ‘fit for purpose’, ie they had accepted it into the ATM System. 
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What about airborne collision avoidance systems on the aircraft (ACAS)?  They are 
not provided as part of ATC.  They exist to compensate for an ATC or pilot 
manoeuvring failure of some kind.  Are they part of the ATM System?  This raises 
large questions about the nature of the ATM System safety – see Brooker (2005a).  
Note that ACAS is not intrinsic to flying the aircraft; it is there to protect against 
conflicts with other air traffic.  ACAS has been installed systematically, by agreement 
between States in ICAO, and has to meet appropriate performance requirements.  
They are not there through a decision by ANSPs alone, but because it was believed 
by States that the system needed further management to ensure that it delivered the 
necessary safety.  This surely adds up to ACAS being part of the ATM System.   
 
ACAS is (obviously) not part of ground-based ATC.  ANSPs do not supply, provide 
or maintain ACAS equipment.  It is States, advised by their aviation safety 
regulators, which agreed to introduce ACAS, working within the larger context of 
Eurocontrol, the European Union and ICAO.  In the UK, the ‘State’ would be the 
Department for Transport (DfT) and the regulator is the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
Safety Regulation Group (SRG) (other countries have different kinds of structures, 
but the responsibilities and professional tasks are broadly similar).  Both the State 
and its regulator therefore play a part in the ATM System.   
 
A test question would be to ask if accidents could happen more frequently if DfT and 
SRG do not do their jobs properly.  The answer is yes.  For example, suppose DfT 
failed to support the introduction of safety improvement equipment; or if SRG were to 
fail to set out the right kinds of rules and regulations for its performance or fails to 
monitor its operational usage.  The regulators cannot act passively: it is not enough 
to promulgate regulations in the office and read an ANSP’s safety case documents; 
thought must be given to the safety consequences of regulations and appropriate 
inspections of real operational practices. 
 
DfT and SRG are not of course ANSPs.  But they have responsibilities for ensuring 
that the UK ATM System is up-to-date and delivers the necessary safety.  Similarly, 
in the UK, the Directorate of Airspace Policy has safety responsibilities.  Thus, if 
airspace is poorly configured, so that (eg) controller workload is badly affected, or if 
regulations are unclear, so that accidents happen because of confused decision-
making, then there could be increased risks.  The point is that these bodies have 
some measure of control over the design of ATM system and its operations, and this 
control carries with it a duty of care (compare tort legislation on fault, eg, Williams 
and Hepple (1976), page 92 et seq).  All the participants in ATM system design and 
operation have a duty of care to make reasonable, skillful and proper use of relevant 
evidence, and generally to apply intelligence and foresight.  Thus, the participants 
must demonstrate that they meet the standards for aviation safety professionals. 
 
Taking all the above into account, the ATM Safety System has the components in 
Figure 2, which just shows national dimensions. 
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Figure 2. Components of ATM System safety 
Hence, the ATM System is much more than the provision of a ground based ATC 
service.  The thick dashed line in the diagram divides its elements into ‘Guardians’ 
and ‘Providers’.  The Guardians inter alia regulate the Providers – but who or what 
regulates the Guardians?  The answer would appear to be that the Guardians make 
their deliberations openly and expose their arguments to technical criticism.   
 
Do all the parts of Figure 2 have to be in the ATM System?  The crucial point is that 
their interactions and dependencies are vital to the creation of something that 
delivers safety – which is why it is better to consider them together as an integrated 
package rather than try to break them apart.  One test question is to ask if a 
particular component’s safety responsibilities could – in principle – be passed to 
another element in Figure 2.  If it cannot be passed, then that component is surely an 
integral element of ATM System safety? 
3. ACCIDENT RISKS 
What are the essential ingredients for ATM systems to be designed safely?  How 
best can lessons learned from accidents and incidents influence safe system 
design? 
 
The measurement of past safety performance is important, but it is not necessarily 
the best tool for improving performance.  Information about achievements does not 
always tell us about how to make things better in future.  Real safety improvement 
relies on an increasing understanding of causal factors for the most probable future 
accidents plus the right tools for dealing with these factors.  ATM is highly successful 
in safety terms, so the sadly ironic problem is that accidents are rare and individual 
events.  This is because a sequence of additional safety defences is now in place to 
limit accident risk.  The mechanisms that occur in ATM accidents tend to bring 
together combinations of circumstances that are unlikely to reoccur, even over many 
decades.   
CNS/DP 
ATC 
ACAS 
Safety 
Regulation & 
Airspace 
Policy 
Government 
PROVIDERS 
GUARDIANS 
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Figure 3. Accident Types and Risks at a particular time 
This nature of ATM accident Types and risks is illustrated in Figure 3.  The areas of 
ellipses represent the probabilities of accidents of a particular ‘Type’.  Nearby 
accident ellipses represent accident Types that have some kind of closeness; that 
are ‘in the same family’.  Each of these accident Types occur extremely rarely (ie in 
reality the corresponding ellipses have tiny dimensions), thanks to the successes of 
ATM’s safety defences, continued high quality training and operational discipline, 
and indeed the lessons learned from past accidents.  The most probable accident 
shown in Figure 3 is of Type A, but it may not happen for many years – and perhaps 
a Type B accident could occur much earlier, just by chance.   
 
Suppose a Type A accident does occur.  If this is in any way a new variety of 
accident in system terms, the whole industry will work hard to find ways of preventing 
a Type A accident from reoccurring.  Its lessons will be added to the safety 
knowledge base. 
 
Figure 4. Accident Types and Risks at some future time after a Type A accident 
A 
Accident types – many in number,  
but each with an extremely low 
frequency per year 
Accident risk 
proportional to 
ellipse size 
B 
A 
Traffic growth has 
enlarged risk of this type 
B 
New accident Type 
Type A accident eliminated 
Frequencies of ‘nearby’ 
accident types reduced 
C 
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At some future time, if safety improvement actions corresponding to Type A are 
completely successful, Type A accidents will be eliminated from the set of accident 
Types, so the area of its ellipse will shrink to zero (Figure 4).  Moreover, the solutions 
to the Type A accident will tend to have beneficial effects of nearby accident Types, 
so the frequencies of these Types will also be reduced.  Hence, in the Figure these 
nearby ellipses will shrink, to indicate a reduced probability.  But it may be that Type 
A accidents cannot be eliminated (which leads on to the topic of safety targets 
examined in a later section).  This may because there are no straightforward 
technical ways of dealing with some weak spots in safety defences.  Or there may 
not be any ‘reasonably practicable’ ways of eliminating them, except possibly over 
several years.   
 
But traffic growth between the two time periods may have increased the probability 
of some other kinds of accident Type – eg Type B.  There may also be new types of 
accident – Type C in the Figure.  The latter could arise because of some novel 
equipment or operational concept.  Again, the frequency of any new accident Types 
would be extremely small, given the intense professional scrutiny of such 
innovations.  But some level of risk might get through the analysis process – how is 
this to be constrained? 
 
Compared with the first time period, the accident rate in the second time period 
would be reduced by the feedback actions and increased by the effects of any new 
accident Types.  Given the maturity of the ATM system and continuing attention to 
safety, this would be expected to deliver a progressively improving risk level, the 
‘natural’ rate of safety improvement.  It should be noted that this safety evolution is 
an international process, not a national or regional one.  Safety analysts, particularly 
in the more developed nations with manufacturing and system development 
capabilities, use all the worldwide information they can obtain to improve their ATM 
system.   
 
Thus, safety analysts have to rely on general knowledge about the nature of failures, 
the effectiveness of safety defences and the information contained in incidents about 
what actually happens.  Experienced analysts will no doubt have in their minds an 
estimate of what these ellipses and their sizes might be.  These estimates are based 
on a combination of general understanding of system failure modes; lessons from 
incidents modelling of potential failure modes, extrapolation, evidence of incidents – 
and also the analysts’ gifts of imagination.   
4. CAUSATION AND NESS TESTS 
The previous section has rather glibly discussed accident Types without explaining 
what such a thing might be or how to categorise such abstractions.  An 
understanding of the nature of these Types is essential if the process and limitations 
of risk modelling are to be understood.  The discussion here uses a concept known 
as a NESS test, where the abbreviation is for ‘Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set’ 
(Wright, 1988 and 2001). 
 
At the heart of any understanding and modelling of accidents has to be a 
methodology for expressing their causation.  Only if one knows what causes 
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accidents and how frequently these causes are in place can any prediction be made 
of the frequency of future accidents.  Causation is an inherently complex topic, but 
the first question asked about an accident is what caused it (the second being ‘how 
do we prevent a similar accident in future?’). 
 
The literature on causation covers psychology, engineering, logic/philosophy and 
legal aspects.  Most of the ATM literature focuses on the first two of these; the shift 
here is to try to use some of the legal thinking on causes, which is itself backed up 
by philosophical approaches.  To repeat the warning in the Introduction, the interest 
here is on finding ways of describing causation in accidents not the tort law 
concerned with responsibility, blame and compensation.  The focus here is the 
search for the meaning of “causally relevant condition” and to find tests by which a 
condition can be judged causally relevant.   
 
Key references on causation start with Hume (1777).  The next major advances in 
thinking about complex causes were made by Mill (1904).  In particular, Mill 
observed that there may be many different distinct sets of conditions that are each 
sufficient to bring about the effect, which means that there is no unique sufficient set, 
the idea of plurality of causes.  Thus, many (different) causal combinations could 
potentially produce mid-air collisions.  The NESS test approach used in the following 
originated with Mackie (1980), Hart and Honoré (1985), and Honoré (2001).  The 
NESS test was developed by Wright (1988 and 2001), with critical input from 
Fumerton and Kress (2001).  The discussion here concentrates on the use of the 
NESS test rather than its underpinning or complexities, and makes particular use of 
Honoré (2001).   
 
First, two key concepts need to be briefly defined: necessary and sufficient.  Again, 
these are intrinsically complex concepts (eg Honoré, 1995).  For two sequential 
events or states A and B, the definitions would be on the lines of: 
A is necessary for B, if the non-occurrence of A guarantees the non-
occurrence of B. 
Thus, the second event would not have occurred had it not been for the former.  [NB: 
A is the ‘antecedent’ and B the ‘consequent’.]  . 
A is sufficient for B if the occurrence of A guarantees the occurrence of B. 
Thus a sufficient condition is one which brings about the event, but where such an 
effect could also have followed from other factors. 
 
Accident investigations generally (but sometimes implicitly) use the ‘but for’ 
causation test.  In determining whether a particular system failure caused the 
accident, it is asked whether the accident would have occurred but for that failure.  
Thus, the actual state of affairs is being compared with a hypothetical state of affairs 
– what would have happened had that particular failure not occurred.  The ‘but for’ 
test is not a conclusive test of causation.  It is often described as a negative test, 
serving the purpose of screening out factors that were in fact irrelevant to the 
outcome.  
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Mackie’s (1980) work on causation added understanding about sets of causal 
conditions.  Each condition in such a set should be identified as a necessary and 
non-redundant part of the set, and where all the conditions are at hand the 
consequence follows with necessity.  There may be several different sufficient sets, 
so for any particular set of conditions is not actually necessary for the consequence 
– there may be an alternative set (or sets) of conditions that will produce the same 
effect.   
 
The definition Wright proposes, the Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set (NESS) 
test, stipulates that: 
A particular condition was a cause of a specific result if and only if it was a 
necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient 
for the occurrence of the result. 
Wright’s test is based on the idea that a fully described causal law would list all the 
conditions that are sufficient for a certain effect.  Irrelevant conditions are eliminated 
with the requirement that only those antecedent conditions that are necessary for the 
sufficiency of the set are included.  The NESS test combines this with Mill’s idea of a 
plurality of causes, so that there is no unique sufficient set.   
 
Under the NESS test, the hypothetical question is slightly different, but similar, to the 
‘but for’ test.  Would the remaining set of conditions, if the condition in question had 
not been at hand, still have produced the consequence?  Thus, the NESS test asks 
whether the condition being tested was a necessary element of the set of conditions 
sufficient to bring about the result.  The simplest way of performing the test is to, 
hypothetically, eliminate the condition in question from the set and consider, against 
the known applicable causal generalisations, whether the effect would still occur.  
But note that the possibility of simply eliminating a condition is not always available – 
in other cases it is necessary to replace the missing condition with another one, 
based on knowledge about what the world ‘should be’. 
 
A simple non-aviation illustration of the NESS test would be person A negligently 
starting a fire, and then later, as the fire is going out naturally, person B accidentally 
pouring petrol on it.  The fire spreads and causes significant damage to person C’s 
property.  A’s action in negligently starting the fire is a NESS cause of the damage to 
affecting C, as is the action of B in pouring petrol on the fire as it was going out.  It is 
not possible to create a subset of actual conditions sufficient for the result without 
including the actions of both A and B.  So A and B are both necessarily part of the 
set of sufficient causes for the harm to C. 
 
Thus, to summarise, the definition of the NESS test says that to cause an accident 
means to complete a set of conditions sufficient to bring the accident about.  This 
clearer concept of causation helps eliminate some problems resulting from a diffuse 
concept of causation.  The NESS test is not a panacea, but it facilitates identification 
of the correct factors rather than unessential or irrelevant elements.   
 
The NESS test needs to be supplemented by clear thinking about the degree of 
remoteness and probability that can be allowed for when something is being 
assessed as a causal factor.  For example, suppose a lack of airline check-in staff 
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results in a delay to many of the passengers on a flight, in an otherwise normal traffic 
situation, which means that that the aircraft misses its flow management slot, takes 
off later, and is then involved in a mid-air collision.  This staff problem should not be 
treated as a NESS cause of the accident or the passengers’ deaths.  The point is 
that, on the basis of information available at the time, the probability of an aircraft 
accident was not substantially increased by the delay to the takeoff arising from the 
passenger handling problems.   
 
Thus, the decision on remoteness can be converted into a question about whether or 
not the system designers/operators could reasonably have foreseen the harm that 
could result from this failure to operate in accord with the standard operating 
requirements in force at that time.  This is actually a potentially very difficult question 
for system designers, because their prime task is to envisage the consequence of 
both standard and non-standard aviation operations coupled with various kinds of 
system failure.  What they can ‘reasonably foresee’ is a much tougher test compared 
with the average member of the public.  In particular, it is the task of system 
designers to change standard requirements.   
 
The delayed passengers example is actually a straightforward case, because it is 
easy to see that the airline managers did not have the kind of information available to 
them that would have indicated a higher probability.  Indeed, the accident’s causes 
would very probably be events occurring after the aircraft had taken off.  As this 
scenario has assumed generally normal traffic, it is difficult to see how a failure of 
ATM system design could be labelled as a cause, unless the system designers could 
somehow have constructed some kind of predictive model demonstrating markedly 
higher risk.  But, again, such a model would have to predict reliably the failures 
arising from pilot/controller decisions post-takeoff. 
 
So what is the connection between accident Types and NESS tests?  The answer is 
that an accident Type can be defined here as a distinct set of conditions that are 
sufficient to bring about the accident.  The accident Type is thus a minimal set of 
causes as constructed by applications of the NESS test – the ‘NESS causes’. 
 
 
Figure 5. Different Accident Types and NESS causes 
Type A* Type AType B 
Major Common cause 
NESS Test 
causes 
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The relation between accident Types and Ness tests is illustrated in Figure 5.  There 
are three accident Types shown: A and A*, which are ‘nearby’, and B, which is of a 
very different kind.  The NESS causes are shown as shaded ellipses leading up to 
the Type risk ellipses.  Again, the size of the NESS ellipses represents some kind of 
risk statement; it will be taken later here to be a conditional probably of that kind of 
event or action occurring given the previous events or actions.   
 
A and A* are nearby because they share all but one of their NESS causes.  B is 
distant from them because it has just one shared cause, the bottom one, which is 
labelled as a major Common cause.  This common cause might be an inherent flaw 
in airspace design.  B in the Figure is, all other things being equal, a simpler accident 
Type than either A or A*, just because there it has fewer NESS causes. 
5. ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS 
Over the history of aviation, the likelihood of a mid-air collision being of Figure 5’s 
Type A, with several causes, has tended to increase, while the chance of it being of 
Type B, with few causes has markedly decreased.  This is simply because system 
defences have been added that eliminate or substantially reduce the probability of 
the ‘one or two causes’ accidents. 
 
Thus, the first airliner mid-air collision was in 1922, between a French Farman 
Goliath and British de Havilland DH18 at Thieuloy-Saint-Antoine in France.  The 
aircraft were flying in opposite directions using exactly the same ground route, in bad 
visibility (Flight, 1922).  Thus, unsafe route design was a major Common cause.   
In 1956, there was a mid-air collision over the Grand Canyon in the USA between a 
Constellation and a DC-7.  The causal factors identified were (ICAO, 1956):  
"The pilots did not see each other in time to avoid the collision.  It is not 
possible to determine why the pilots did not see each other, but the evidence 
suggests that it resulted from any one or a combination of the following 
factors: 1) Intervening clouds reducing time for visual separation; 2) Visual 
limitations due to cockpit visibility, and; 3) Preoccupation with normal cockpit 
duties; 4) Preoccupation with matters unrelated to cockpit duties such as 
attempting to provide the passengers with a more scenic view of the Grand 
Canyon area; 5) Physiological limits to human vision reducing the time 
opportunity to see and avoid the other aircraft, or; 6) Insufficiency of en-route 
air traffic advisory information due to inadequacy of facilities and lack of 
personnel in air traffic control."  
This accident led to a complete overhaul of the USA aviation system, in particular the 
expansion of controlled airspace and faster introduction of secondary radars and 
flight data processing; and indeed can be seen as the genesis of airborne collision 
avoidance systems.  For present purposes, the key feature is the increase in the 
number of causal factors and the wider system design and management issues. 
 
The most recent airliner mid-air collision in European airspace was the Überlingen 
accident (BFU, 2004).  Nunes and Laursen (2004) tried to establish a causal chain 
for the accident.  Their list of ‘Contributing Factors’ in the Überlingen accident 
includes: 
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(a) Single Man Operations 
(b) Downgraded Radar [STCA] 
(c) Dual Frequency Responsibility 
(d) Phone System 
(e) ACAS 
(f) Corporate Culture 
Assessing these as NESS causes is an interesting exercise.  Each has to be 
examined very carefully.  For example, the ACAS cause is not actually a failure of 
the ACAS equipment but that the nature of its alerts was not communicated 
automatically to the controller.  Moreover, the Corporate Culture heading covers the 
fact that ‘the integration of ACAS (TCAS II) into the system aviation was insufficient 
and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy’ (BFU, 2004).   
 
In the present context, the main message drawn by Nunes and Laursen is that the 
Überlingen tragedy was a consequence of multiple system failures – operational, 
managerial, technical and regulatory.  This accident had several NESS causes.   
 
Accidents are rare, but incidents are less so.  What should be judged to be a 
‘serious’ incident, given the formal description of accident Types attempted above?  
The word incident can be used in several different ways.  For ATM mid-air collisions 
it is often taken to be an event in which the separation minima required between 
aircraft is breached (eg see the National Air Traffic Services SSE scheme sketched 
in Neil et al (2003) and the FAA/Eurocontrol (1998) report on separation minima).  
But is this the most useful viewpoint of ‘serious’ in safety terms?  On the NESS test 
approach, an accident is an occurrence in which there is a sufficient set of causes, 
so a serious incident might best be judged as one in which just one or possibly two 
of these causes were absent.  Thus, an incident is seen as being an ‘incomplete 
accident’, where the addition of just one or two causal factors would have produced 
the accident comprised of those NESS cause elements.  
 
A simple non-aviation analogy of incident seriousness would be a motorcyclist who 
falls off because of a bad stretch of road surface.  The chance of the motorcyclist 
being killed by a following vehicle is dependent on the traffic at that time.  It might 
happen that there is no other traffic for some minutes, so the rider can remount 
safety.  But if the condition of the surface could be equally poor for the next 
motorcyclist, when other traffic might be much greater, then this represents a serious 
incident in terms of the need for road improvement.   
 
Thus, on the incomplete accident view of an incident, the most serious ones would 
be those in which just one extra causal factor would complete the accident, and for 
which the conditional probability for that factor was the largest, ie they would be the 
most probable consequence of the occurrence of these completing NESS causes.  
[Brooker (2005b) discusses this issue starting from different premises.]  These are 
the most ‘useful’ serious incidents, in that they provide the best information about 
potential future accidents, ie the probable sizes of the ellipses in Figure 3.  This also 
implies that reducing the likelihood of Common causes is a key ingredient to 
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improving safety, because they can be completed to become accidents in so many 
different ways. 
 
Some important examples of incomplete accidents can be found in Airprox reports 
(UKAB, 1999-).  Table 1 is an extract from Brooker (2005c).  The first column is the 
Airprox number (the first four digits are the year); the Summary is an edited version 
of the Airprox report text; and the right hand columns are the horizontal (H) and 
vertical (V) distances at the closest point of approach. 
Airprox 
number 
Summary H 
Nm 
V 
feet 
1999127 Controller had issued a descent clearance that would have led 
aircraft 1 to descend through the level of aircraft 2, which he 
had inadvertently not taken into account. 
0 1100 
1999200 Controller did not take aircraft 1 into account when he 
descended aircraft 2. 
4.5 400 
2000032 Controller gave ‘erroneously and essentially unforced descent 
instruction’ to aircraft 2. 
2 700 
2001069 Controller allowed aircraft 1 to climb to the level that he had 
cleared aircraft 2 to fly at, without coordination. 
2.8 700 
Table 1. Examples of Commercial Air Transport Airproxes with ATC descending/climbing an 
aircraft into another’s path: ‘Outside [STCA] parameters’ 
The key point about the incidents in Table 1 is that STCA did not alert the controller: 
the manoeuvre took place to quickly for it to operate – the meaning of the ‘Outside 
[STCA] parameters’ in the figure title.  ACAS did operate.  ACAS, plus the density 
and geometry of traffic in the airspace at the time, were the operational safety 
defences.  Thus, these actually correspond to a small number of NESS causes 
rather than a many-cause accident such as Überlingen.   
 
In the safety literature, these incidents would generally be considered as ‘Errors of 
Commission’, although some would actually fall into the class of ‘Erroneous 
Execution’.  This is in contrast with a failure of a controller to detect/act on a large 
deviation from the planned flightpath – which would usually be classed as an ‘Error 
of Omission’ (eg see Hollnagel, 2000).  Relevant definitions are: 
• Error of omission: lack of action, so system/component/function status quo is 
preserved rather than (necessarily) changed; 
• Error of commission: one that changes the system to an unsafe state.   
Errors of commission when aircraft are in proximity are obviously potentially very 
hazardous.  Thus, it is vital to find ways of preventing them, of detecting them, and of 
ensuring that the remaining safety defences would be effective. 
6. SAFETY TARGETS, ACCIDENT TYPES AND COLLISION RISK 
The previous paragraphs start to enable the possibility of answering the questions: 
What do design safety targets really mean and imply for risk modelling?  In what 
circumstances can future accident risk really be modelled with sufficient precision?  
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How is completeness of accident Types to be ensured – how is it possible ensure 
that all abnormal modes are included?  If these desires cannot be met, then how is 
safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational and technical changes? 
 
This section first outlines some background on important features of Target Levels of 
Safety (TLS): this is a summary of Brooker (2004b).  A TLS is a design hurdle, a 
quantified risk level that a system should – ie be designed to – deliver.  It has to 
provide assurance that the future system – with changes – is as safe, preferably 
safer, than the present one.  The TLS relates to ‘total system design…the implication 
is that all types of failure, mechanical, procedural and human, which generate a risk 
of collision will be accounted for’ (Brooker and Ingham, 1977).  A TLS covers all 
aviation-related causes.  However, it does not usually attempt to cover the 
consequences of terrorism or criminal behaviour, ie where there is an intent or 
willingness to cause an accident (although the literature has not always been clear 
on this).   
 
A TLS appropriate for accidents arising from mid-air collisions has been developed 
since the 1970s.  It is usually derived by taking historical accident rates, which show 
a progressive reduction over time, and extrapolating forward, thus getting tighter and 
tighter over time.  The TLS is measured in fatal aircraft accidents, ie accidents in 
which at least one person in the aircraft was killed, per so many aircraft flying hours.  
The recent ICAO figure of 1.5 x 10-8 fatal aircraft accidents per flying hour (RGCSP, 
1995) is the rate corresponding to mid-air collisions – for any reason and in any 
spatial dimension – in en route flight in controlled airspace.   
 
Mid-air collisions are now rare. Because of this, it is not possible to estimate the 
current accident rate in Europe with great statistical confidence.  To validate with 
statistical confidence a rate of 1.5 x 10-8 fatal aircraft accidents per flying hour would 
require of the order of 109 observed hours.  But the annual European flying hours are 
only of the order of 2 x 107.  Estimates of the future accident rate (an Actual Level of 
Safety – ALS), given traffic growth and new operational and technical features, 
therefore rely on risk modelling.  Risk modelling has to rely on an understanding of 
the causes represented in accident Types, which necessarily includes extrapolation 
of present system features, in particular human performance and failure rates.  The 
ALS has to cover all the ellipse blobs in Figures 3 and 4.   
 
Quantitative ATM risk modelling has been carried out using a variety of 
mathematical, computational and simulation models.  The range of models is now 
very large.  An extremely useful overview of the field is set out in FAA/Eurocontrol 
(1998), which inter alia provides 40 pages of annotated bibliography.  This report’s 
title includes the phrase ‘separation safety modeling’, and much of the ATM collision 
risk work has been concerned with setting separation minima between aircraft: how 
far they should be kept apart procedurally (eg flight levels) and by ATC actions (eg 
distance between aircraft being vectored).  These minima fulfil many functions (eg 
see Brooker, 2004a), but they are essentially the key ATM ‘system safety control’ 
parameters.   
 
An analogy for separation minima is a road speed limit.  The road accident rate could 
be reduced to virtually zero if all vehicles went very slowly.  But society recognises 
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that people want to travel quickly, so is prepared to trade off the statistical 
expectation of some accidents for a ‘fair’ speed.  Speed is obviously not the only 
factor – some drivers are drunk and others are just reckless.  Nor can the speed limit 
be enforced at every point on every road.  These factors add up to the present speed 
limit and 10 to 20 people being killed every day in the UK.  ATM separation minima 
correspond to a far tighter safety regime in terms of the restrictions on pilots, the 
existence of ATC, conflict detection systems and safety monitoring.  There is still a 
trade off, but it is made explicit by safety management and risk modelling – and it 
produces uneconomic flight paths for some aircraft.   
 
What are the causes of – future – mid-air collisions?  Again, the subject is 
intrinsically very complex.  FAA/Eurocontrol (1998) provides about 25 pages 
outlining (!) factors that can potentially affect separation safety; Brooker (2005c) 
examines UK data on Airproxes for commercial air transport aircraft using UK 
controlled airspace with a radar service, in which STCA and ACAS are functioning 
properly.  [NB: an ACAS alert is in some sense a failure of controller-provided 
separation.]  A simple general picture is shown schematically in Figure 6.   
 
 
Figure 6. Schematic of defective flightpaths leading to mid-air collision 
The scenario shown in Figure 6 is aircraft 1 suffering a mid-air collision with aircraft 
2, both shown as boxes.  The picture is in the frame of reference in which aircraft 2 is 
at rest, ie it shows the relative flightpath of aircraft 1.  The orientation of the aircraft is 
left open – at the outset, they could be horizontally or vertically separated.  Aircraft 1 
follows the ‘reasonable intent’ flightpath (RIF), shown here as a straight line but in 
reality usually much more complex.  By reasonable intent is meant the following 
(Brooker 2002): 
Reasonable Intent An inference usually made ‘after the event’.  The 
reasonable intent flightpath here is what a competent controller would have 
considered a reasonable (albeit perhaps not perfect) course of action; the 
Defective 
flightpaths 
DEF 
Alert 
Reasonable intent flightpath (RIF) 
(aircraft 1 relative motion to aircraft 2) 
aircraft 1 
aircraft 2 
Intended 
separation 
Planning Operation
ATM System 
phases 
D E 
F
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pilot’s decisions and actions were what other pilots would have judged 
suitable practice (albeit perhaps not the ideal decisions). 
It must be stressed that RIFs are not always static concepts.  Some flightpaths have 
to be tactical in nature, because a complete set of failsafe routeings cannot be 
provided into the immediate future of the flights.  Environmental conditions, eg the 
wind vector and way that the aircraft is being flown, can mean that what was 
predicted to be a safe flightpath has to be changed tactically by the controller in 
order to ensure continued safety.   
 
A defective flightpath (DEF) is a gross deviation from the RIF.  This implies – a 
crucial point that will be discussed further – that to monitor/measure DEFs the 
analyst needs to know the corresponding RIF).  A DEF would include people’s 
misjudgements and blunders as normally understood.  It would also cover gross loss 
of ‘Position Integrity’: operationally extreme (‘out of tolerance’) errors on radar, GPS, 
altimetry; measurements lost, markedly inadequate display information; signals 
being corrupted or lost.  The huge improvements over recent decades have 
eliminated many of these technical problems.   
 
Associated with the RIF is an intended (or implied) separation between the two 
aircraft at their planned closest point.  A collision occurs if this separation is ‘eaten 
up’ by some kind of DEF.  This might be when two aircraft pass each other or when 
two aircraft supposed to be flying in-trail (‘station keeping’) lose the required 
separation.  Figure 6 correlates the evolution of the reasonable intent flightpath with 
the ATM system phases of the aircraft’s flight.  The three phases noted here, 
Planning, Operation and Alert are and explained further later (for more detail, see 
Brooker (2005).  The words used have normal meanings; thus, Planning refers to the 
entry of the aircraft into the airspace, Operations covers the work of controllers (eg 
monitoring the aircraft’s flight), and Alert covers STCA and ACAS, including the 
actions of controllers and pilots in response to such alerts.   
 
Three examples of defective flightpaths are shown: marked D, E and F: 
D DEF occurs very early on, in Planning phase, eg with aircraft being put 
on the wrong routeing; then controller monitoring and alerts all fail to 
get aircraft back onto RIF 
E DEF occurs during Operational phase, eg controller neglects to ensure 
separation, and the alerts fail to get aircraft back to RIF 
F DEF occurs when aircraft are near to their closest point of approach, so 
that some or all of the alerts are not effective (compare the examples in 
Table 1). 
The Überlingen tragedy probably falls into the D category.  Most UK observed 
Airproxes involving commercial air transport aircraft are incomplete versions of E and 
F (eg see the analysis in Brooker, 2005c).  Note also that the DEFs shown in the 
Figure correspond to the last defective flightpath for a flight.  Previous defective 
segments of flightpath that have been successfully returned to the RIF complicate 
the picture (compare Brooker, 2005b).  These previous defective flightpaths and 
corrections would not usually be NESS causes of an accident, because their 
existence would not have been necessary for it to occur. 
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Thus, the first ingredient for a mid-air collision is some initiating event to produce a 
DEF – call it iDEF.  Not all such events will produce a collision.  The next ingredient 
is a combination of failures of the system’s remaining safety defences, so the aircraft 
is not finally returned to the RIF.  Again, this may be one NESS cause or several 
depending how far to the right the DEF occurs in Figure 6 – the ‘Right Hand’ (RH) 
defences.  The third ingredient is that the aircrafts’ closest approach to each other is 
sufficiently near for the possibility of a collision, which depends on how large the 
aircraft are and their relative velocities.  [Note that a close approach might also be 
converted into a mid-air collision if the RH defences do not play their role effectively 
– an ‘induced collision’.]  The final factor also has to include elements to describe the 
density, dimensions and velocities of aircraft.  This combination of ‘traffic factors’ and 
aircraft dimension/velocity – a ‘kinematic scaler’ – is really a scaling factor for the 
airspace sub-system under consideration rather than a ‘cause’ in the normal sense 
of the word.  For example, it has to cover the fact that aircraft at the same nominal 
altitude are, through ‘chance’ altimetry errors, separated vertically.   
 
The traffic factors reduction in risk is more than ‘providence’.  Large, cautious 
distances are fed into the system design, so that only gross deviations are safety-
significant and so that ATC can detect and act in time.  Note that, if the aircraft are 
not flying in ‘formal’ structure routeings, eg parallel tracks or crossings on fixed route 
systems, then the traffic factors + kinematic scaler have to be some kind of 
probabilistic average of potential risk configurations.  The nature of the DEF will 
affect relative velocity factors. 
 
With each NESS cause can be associated a conditional probability.  This is the 
chance that, given what has gone before, this particular cause will be operative.  
Thus, in a situation in which a controller has climbed an aircraft into the path of 
another flight, the next NESS cause would be some kind of failure of the 
STCA/controller combination to provide a safe resolution to the encounter.  This 
probability value is not a fixed value for all encounters – it will depend on the relative 
positions of the aircraft and their closing speeds AND the context of the controller’s 
tasks at that time.  How can such probabilities be estimated with precision? 
 
The mid-air collision rate CR (which can be stated as a number per so many system 
flying hours) can therefore be written as expression A: 
CR =  Σ R(iDEF) x P(RH failures) x (Traffic factors) x (Kinematic scaler) A 
Here:  
R rate (eg) per hour 
P probability 
iDEF particular initial DEF event 
Σ summation over all possible iDEFs 
RH failures all the safety defences to right of iDEF fail 
Traffic factors appropriate densities of conflicting aircraft iDEF 
Kinematic scaler appropriate aircraft size and velocities combination for iDEF 
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The analytical equation A for CR above is an exact one.  It does no more than spell 
out the mechanisms by which collisions logically have to occur.  The hard problem is 
how to populate the parameters in expression A with sensible numbers.   
 
What would be sensible numbers?  In the present context they must be numbers for 
which there is reasonable statistical evidence, ie which are known to a degree of 
precision.  They should be capable of validation in the largest sense, ie that an 
independent, competent person could realistically carry out the same measurements 
and/or would produce very similar extrapolations on measured data.  What can 
reasonably be modelled with precision – what is knowable?  A probability that cannot 
be independently verified has little real existence. 
 
This parameter population process must achieve high standards.  The following 
extract, from studies on the Space Shuttle (NASA, 2005), is just as pertinent to civil 
aviation safety: 
“Validation – Determination that an item meets its intended purpose in its 
operating environment.  For models/analysis tools, design environments and 
simulations, validation is the determination that the item accurately reflects the 
subject being modelled…Central to the safe and reliable conduct of high-risk 
complex technical endeavours is rigorous and consistent understanding of, 
and adherence to, [validation and other] terms and the processes they 
describe.  
This understanding and adherence also applies to methods leading to the end 
state (ie models and analysis tools utilized during validation).  As an example, 
if one is to assert ‘validation has been accomplished through probabilistic 
analysis’, the analysis must rest upon fundamental mathematical principles 
and undergo unflinching rigor.” 
These are very demanding criteria.  They place limits on the kinds of calculation that 
can be deemed to meet the standard required.  They raise issues about the use of a 
technique such as TOPAZ [TOPAZ is the acronym for ‘Traffic Organization & 
Perturbation AnalyZer].  Descriptions of TOPAZ are given in Blom et al (2003) and 
ARIBA (1999).  TOPAZ uses a range of sophisticated mathematical techniques.  It 
does not appear to correspond to simple physical pictures of the consequences of 
erroneous events/failures.  Because it is to some extent a commercial product, it is 
not possible to track how the model works through following simple real-life 
examples.  It is not possible to verify that the model as it might be used in practice 
ensures any kind of completeness in hazard analysis terms.  It is not possible to 
verify that the navigational performance and human factors-related probability 
distributions used match the range of evidence that can be gathered.  The published 
material does not appear to present detailed information on data, distribution 
extrapolations or sampling fluctuations. 
 
TOPAZ techniques may well be of use, particularly in understanding how different 
human factors aspects might contribute to risk.  But they do not appear to provide 
decision-makers with a robust, explicit and verifiable way of answering a key safety 
question.   
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7. RISK ESTIMATION 
So how are the rates R and probabilities P to be estimated?  A starting point is to 
break down the collision risk calculation into different types of ATC-planned 
separation.  To understand how collisions might occur, it is necessary to spell out 
how ATC is structured and acts to prevent collisions in these different circumstances.  
Proximate aircraft will be kept separated in different ways: some will be vectored 
horizontally by ATC; others will cross each other’s flightpath with vertical separation; 
other pairs will be kept longitudinally separated (eg prior to being sequenced for 
landing); and some aircraft will be kept safely separated by being put on parallel 
tracks.  Moreover, there are different types of ATC process in different phases of 
flight, eg compare terminal area and en route ATC regarding the tailoring of the 
flightpath for appropriate sequencing.  Call these different types of ATC process 
‘proximity categories’. 
 
In each proximity category, ATC should always be ensuring a particular kind of 
separation in at least one specific x, y or z dimension – but note that it cannot be 
assumed that all aircraft will enter the sub-airspace of interest ‘separation compliant’.  
The accident Types corresponding to these categories will therefore tend to have 
some NESS causes in common.  Each proximity category will have corresponding 
traffic factors and kinematic scalers.  The total collision risk CR will be a summation 
of the collision risks in the proximity categories weighted by flying hours/movements, 
ie expression B: 
CR =  Σ Σ R(iDEFc) x P(RH failures) x (Traffic factors) x (Kinematic scaler)   B
where iDEFc now represents an initial DEF event in the proximity category c. 
 
The key to estimating collision risk is an understanding of the causal nature 
underlying the rates R and probabilities P in the general CR expression.  A simple 
picture of the Figure 6 process would be a four-stage process shown in Figure 7. 
 
Stage NESS Causes Nature 
  
Planning controller HF 
Ð  
Operation controller HF 
Ð  
STCA Mech + HF – controller analyses info and acts 
Ð  
ACAS 
 
Mech + HF – pilot acts on alert 
Figure 7. Simple four stage ATM processes for errors and recoveries 
In Figure 7, HF stands for human factors and Mech for mechanistic (eg through 
simple computer extrapolation of aircraft paths based on radar data).  Mech + HF 
means Mech combined with HF; thus, a controller gets an STCA, analyses the 
circumstances and then makes a judgement about the correct action.  The Mech 
components in the first two stages would generally be expected to be second order 
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compared with the HF aspects.  The NESS Causes for a particular accident Type will 
be spread across the stages according to the accident Type being considered. 
 
The HF rates and probabilities will depend on the ATC context leading to the iDEF 
and the subsequent recovery stages.  They are intrinsically dependent on ‘soft’ HF 
issues, such as selection, training, acceptable workload and safety culture.  Thee will 
be regulatory influences, eg consider the Überlingen tragedy causes referenced 
above, where the probability of a successful intervention via TCAS was ‘modified’.   
 
Figure 8. Risk dependencies in performance prediction (adapted from Hollnagel, 2000) 
The problem of ATC context is illustrated in Figure 8.  To quote Hollnagel (2000): 
“The overall purpose of performance prediction is to describe how a scenario 
may possibly develop, given the existing working conditions.  In many cases 
the representation of a scenario only provides the basic structure of the 
events but leaves out the detailed conditions that may influence how an event 
develops.  In order to make the prediction, the scenario description must 
therefore be supplemented by information about the conditions or factors that 
can influence the propagation of events.  One of these is the variability of 
human performance, which in itself depends on the general performance 
conditions—including the previous developments … Performance prediction 
must therefore describe the likely context before it goes on to consider the 
actions that may occur”.   
 
The inherent predictability problems are well summarised by Dougherty (1997):  
• the context of performance is variable; 
• performance itself is variable; 
• performance and its context are too complicated, with too many parameters. 
The last is a lack of knowledge, which may be reduced over time, but only if the right 
kind of data is collected. 
 
Consider the first two stages in Figure 7.  Suppose an initial DEF occurs and is 
recovered.  What would be the rate of ATC generating such a DEF and the 
probability that it is recovered by ATC?  [NB: it is important here to distinguish 
Conditions that 
may influence how 
the event develops 
Scenario 
description / event 
tree (incomplete) 
Prediction of 
likely 
performance
Human 
performance 
variability 
Expected 
outcome 
(consequences, 
probabilities) 
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between non-DEF deviations, the normal variations in track, ie the equivalent of flight 
technical error, and a DEF, which requires special recovery attention.]  But where is 
the data for this to come from? – it is unlikely that this is routinely recorded.  Is there 
good data on the frequency with which controllers operate tactically or use particular 
separation minima?  Is it really possible to detect systematically DEF planning 
defects that are being corrected in operation?  Are DEFs monitored and recorded by 
the ANSP when there is no apparent risk of mid-air collision?   
 
The rate of DEFs has to be linked to the causal factors associated with the rate at 
which trained and experienced pilots and controllers generate DEFs or certain kinds 
of error leading to a DEF.  If the risk assessment were being carried out for a system 
in which there are changes to HF processes, it would be necessary to understand 
the causal structure for the elements (Figure 8) affected by such changes.  Exactly 
the same kinds of questions need to be posed for the operational recovery stage.   
 
The data situation is sometimes better for the Alert stage, simply because alert 
events are more likely to be recorded systematically.  The UK has its Airprox 
reporting system, which provides information about STCA and ACAS events.  Thus, 
there is the probability of real knowledge of DEFs detected by STCA and ACAS.  
Something can therefore be said about probabilities of success of the Alert phase by 
examining STCA/TCAS II RA events, eg Brooker (2005).   
7.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
Risk modelling in most safety critical industries is accomplished through Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment – PSA (other terms, such as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, PRA 
and Quantitative Risk Assessment, QRA, are also used).  The use of PSA is often 
suggested as appropriate for ATC collision risk estimation – but most often by people 
who have not attempted to use it for this purpose in real life.  What are the issues 
and problems? 
 
The key point of the PSA approach is that the risk of accidents is estimated by 
analysing the whole sequences of events that could produce an accident: the ‘causal 
chain’ (eg Apostolakis, 2004).  At each stage, the probability of an event’s success or 
failure in safety terms has to be quantified.  For events representing the function of 
mechanical or electronic components, the failure probability can potentially be 
determined by observations of the performance of that particular sub-system 
(although simulations and ‘expert judgement’ are also used).  Thus, a good PSA 
estimate requires a sufficiently detailed understanding of failure modes and 
engineering characteristics.   
 
But complex engineering systems, particularly ATM, generally contain people as an 
intrinsic part of the ‘safety-delivery’ operation.  These people have to assess 
information and act in certain ways when confronted by specific system states, eg a 
controller seeing two aircraft in unplanned proximity must issue instructions to 
restore safe separation.  Thus, these kinds of events necessarily require probabilities 
to be estimated for ‘human components’ – the task of Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA). 
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It is inherently difficult to produce estimates of event frequency for infrequent 
occurrences.  The modelled PSA chain may well be appropriate, but the difficulty is 
in ‘populating’ it with relevant data.  An important example is Foot (1994), a trial PSA 
of UK en route air traffic operations.  This study demonstrates the combinatorial 
explosion in fault tree complexity – there are a very large number of potentially 
hazardous system states – and hence the requirement to estimate an equally large 
number of failure mode parameters.   
 
The traditional way of getting around the problem of the inherent uncertainty in PSA 
is to aim for a cautious assessment.  If it is possible to show that safety targets would 
be met, even when ignoring significant safety barriers (such as ACAS – of which 
more later) and overestimating failure rates, then the problem is resolved.  
Unfortunately, this seldom works, even with current ATM systems: a collection of 
‘cautious’ assumptions generally tends to produce over-pessimistic risk estimates, 
and hence has little value for safety decision-makers.   
 
Probably the most compelling example of these calculation problems is set out DNV 
(1997), which dealt with estimating the safe spacing of P-RNAV parallel routes.  It is 
a lengthy, detailed and thoughtful piece of work using best practice PSA techniques.  
Considerable efforts were made by DNV to try to ensure completeness of description 
and quantification of significant critical hazards; and major efforts were made to 
gather and assess relevant human error and performance data.  DNV (1997) 
produced collision risk estimates for parallel routes taking account of ATC 
intervention.  Unfortunately, the uncertainties associated with the predicted risk 
covered what DNV referred to as a large “grey” band (eg for same direction traffic, 
the safe spacing was estimated as between 5Nm and 15Nm).   
 
The DNV work illustrates the problems of PSA very clearly.  ATC safety analysis 
necessarily requires sequences and probabilities to be estimated for failure events 
involving ‘human components’.  It is very difficult to produce estimates of these 
generally infrequent events, particularly for errors of commission, and a collection of 
‘cautious’ assumptions produces over-pessimistic – not practically usable – risk 
estimates.  To quote the subsequent DNV (2003) report:  
“Using hazard analysis and associated techniques to estimate the tails has 
been tried in the past with inconclusive results.  The uncertainties associated 
with such approaches are large and the benefits for this particular scenario 
relative to extrapolating known data are unclear.” 
 
These difficulties with HRA methods, particularly in the nuclear power plant case, 
have themselves generated a huge literature.  Much of the impetus for a very critical 
approach to the subject came from a special edition of ‘Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety’ in 1990.  The editorial by Dougherty and the papers by Swain and 
Moray are particularly good analyses of the issues.  More recent references about 
the problems of HRA are Embrey (2004) (in particularly referring to work by Kirwan 
(1994) on HRA accuracy) and Apostolakis (2004)).   
 
Dougherty (1990) set out the problems with HRA simply: 
• Insufficient empirical data 
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• Concerns about use of expert judgements, particularly for rare events 
• Lack of confidence that simulator data matches real life 
• Disconnects between modelling assumptions and psychological knowledge 
• Use of ‘Performance Shaping factors’ to modify data 
Moray (1990) commented: 
“The use of ‘expert judgement’ is a polite name for ‘expert guesses’, and we 
do not have data to validate the accuracy of the guesses. 
The attempt to find a single number is an attempt to establish a context-free 
universal fact about human performance.  No such thing exists.  It is simply 
fantasy to think that the probability of human error is described by a single 
number… 
[Re flight crew error rates]  How do any of us survive?  The answer (and the 
lesson) is that in the case of airliners they are quite forgiving systems…there 
is time enough, usually, to make errors, discover them, and recover from 
them.” 
 
These methodological concerns have not been resolved in the last 15 years; eg to 
quote Apostolakis (2004)   
“Several items that are either not handled well or not at all by current QRAs 
are: 
Human errors during accident conditions.  For an accident in progress, we 
can distinguish between errors of omission (the crew fails to take prescribed 
actions) and errors of commission (the crew does something that worsens the 
situation).  These errors, especially those of commission, are not handled well 
and research efforts are underway to improve the situation…It is also 
important to point out that experience has shown that the crews often become 
innovative during accidents and use unusual means for mitigation.  These 
human actions are not modeled in QRAs. 
Safety culture.  When asked, managers of hazardous activities or facilities say 
that they put safety first.  Unfortunately, experience shows that this is not 
always the case.  While it is relatively easy to ascribe an accident that has 
occurred to a bad safety culture, the fact is that defining indicators of a good 
or bad safety culture in a predictive way remains elusive.  QRAs certainly do 
not include the influence of culture on crew behavior and one can make a 
good argument that they will not do so for a very long time, if ever.” 
 
Perhaps the best overview evidence of the limited usefulness of PSA/HRA methods 
in ATM is given by FAA/Eurocontrol (1998).  This was a joint FAA and Eurocontrol 
Organization effort to ‘model the impact on safety resulting from changing required 
separation minima and introducing new technologies in controlled, domestic 
airspace’.  Some 30 recognised safety experts developed this authoritative report.  It 
consists of 178 pages, including an extensive bibliography of all the techniques 
successfully used in ATM risk assessment worldwide.  Less than 1½ pages of the 
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document were concerned with PSA/HRA; without any mention of major successes 
in tackling real-world ATM questions.   
 
A collision risk PSA incorporating a HRA is thus a complex calculation process that 
is likely to produce usable answers only at some indefinite point in the future.  Can a 
simpler model framework be constructed that is soundly based on available data?   
7.2 Collision Risk Modelling (CRM) 
As evidenced in FAA/Eurocontrol (1998), the great bulk of practically useful accident 
risk estimations use the simplest model that can be soundly based, ie whose 
parameters can be reliably estimated from the data likely to be obtainable.  The 
phrase Collision Risk Model (CRM) will be used here to describe analytical 
frameworks on which are ‘hung’ empirical/statistical data about DEF rates and failure 
probabilities.  Reich (1966) was the first generally accepted model of this type; a 
review of such models is set out in FAA/Eurocontrol (1998); some successful 
applications are listed later here. 
 
A CRM is essentially developed by compressing the stages in Figures 6 and 7.  It 
must not lose ‘risk content’ from the basic CR equation.  To lose such content would 
be a failure to ensure completeness of risk estimation.   
 
The first step is to restrict the analysis to a particular well-specified proximity 
category c (eg a loss of vertical separation for aircraft on a fixed route structure).  But 
this must not be done too finely; otherwise it will become very difficult to assess what 
should be the corresponding safety target.  The ideal would be to add all these 
categories together – but the following will show why this is intrinsically difficult.  This 
is mainly done to restrict the complexity of the failure and probabilities, traffic factors, 
and Kinematic scaler.  So the expression B becomes: 
CRc =  Σ R(iDEFc) x P(RH failures) x (Traffic factors) x (Kinematic scaler)   C
The next step is to move away from the initial DEF, iDEFc, to the final DEF, fDEFc.  
This is the rate of DEFs before the final recovery response to urgent action by the 
controller, which may have involved automatic alerts.  If a DEF were returned to the 
appropriate RIF by ‘normal’ controller operational action, then it would not be 
counted as a fDEFc.  In terms of the CR expression, the first two terms are changed 
to: 
CRc =  Σ R(fDEFc) x P(RHf failures) x (Traffic factors) x (Kinematic scaler)   D
where the second term again refers to the probability of failure to resolve, but this 
time after the final DEF.  Again, note that this recasting of the equation has not lost 
any risk content.  The final step is to re-label and reorder the equation, putting at the 
right hand side the probabilities relating to controller and pilot actions 
CRc =  Σ fDEFc Performance 
rate 
x Traffic factors x
Kinematic 
scaler x
Pilot & 
controller 
action 
  E 
This final expression E is of the form used in the Reich and similar models.  Reich 
(1966) and FAA/Eurocontrol (1998) show examples of the formal algebraic 
expressions, in particular the kinds of expressions to be expected for the Traffic 
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factors and Kinematic scaler components.  The only issue to be resolved is what is 
included the final action probability class: interventions by controllers have been 
included in some models (eg Brooker and Lloyd, 1978); STCA has been considered 
as a possibility in others (eg DNV, 2003) and argued for (Brooker, 2004c); policy 
about incorporating ACAS has been raised by Brooker (2005a). 
 
The practical use of a model of the expression E form has to rest on a number of 
assumptions and caveats: 
(i) All the elements in this equation must potentially be measured or estimated by 
appropriate extrapolations of statistical distributions.   
(ii) The HF elements in the early generation of DEFs have been hidden in the 
expression.  They are within a ‘black box’.  The final DEF rate asks about the 
rate at which defective outputs are generated.  Hence, the rare event 
frequency is obtained by reasoned factoring of infrequent but measurable 
events, rather than through full understanding of mechanisms and component 
probabilities.  [This is the main deficiency of CRM in terms of risk estimation 
for markedly changed operational concepts.] 
(iii) To know if there has been a DEF it is necessary to know what the 
corresponding RIF is.  This may be a deterministic issue, eg deviating from a 
parallel route system, or a stochastic one, eg the relative orientations of 
aircraft being vectored horizontally. 
(iv) To know the rate of all DEF occurrences per hour of operation, it is necessary 
to have some kind of measurement process.  This could be routine, (eg 
through radar deviation monitoring), or through special measurement 
programmes, or by realistic simulations, or through rigorous reporting by 
controllers/pilots of gross deviations from the RIF.  Data is crucial: it must be 
available or gettable.  It is usually necessary to extrapolate DEF 
characteristics from this source data. 
(v) A category c may contain several components with different conflict 
geometries, eg dependent on whether the DEF was caused by a data entry 
error or a miscommunication of information.  These different geometries may 
correspond to different relative velocities at closest approach, ie the kinematic 
factors could be markedly different. 
 
The above are actually quite restrictive constraints, which limit the possible 
application of this kind of (potentially) precise CRM to specific kinds of ATM sub-
system.  The practical successes of a CRM approach (mainly en route but some for 
airport issues; most, but not all, based on variants of the Reich model) include: 
• VOR-defined routes (ICAO, 1976) 
• Longitudinal NAT separation (Brooker and Lloyd, 1978) 
• NAT Track System (Brooker and White, 1979) 
• Radar separation (Sharpe, 1991)   
• Precision Runway Monitor (FAA, 1991) 
• RVSM (Harrison and Moek, 1992) 
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• P-RNAV parallel routes (DNV, 1997 and 2003) 
To stress again, these are real examples of practical successes that have been used 
in key decision-making. 
7.3 Loosely- versus Tightly-coupled Models 
A useful way of thinking about potential ATM accidents is to construct two broad 
categories according to the kind of technological and human system structures that 
are being employed to ensure safety.  These are called tightly- and loosely-coupled 
models.  These terms originated with Weick (1976), and were subsequently used by 
Perrow (1984) for the purpose of analysing accidents.   
 
Perrow in fact defined two important dimensions: interactive complexity and 
loose/tight coupling:  
Interactive complexity refers to the presence of unfamiliar or unplanned and 
unexpected sequences of events in a system, either not visible or not 
immediately comprehensible.   
A tightly-coupled system is highly interdependent, with each part of the 
system being tightly linked to many other parts, so a change in one part can 
rapidly affect the status of other parts.  So tightly-coupled systems respond 
quickly to perturbations – but this response may be disastrous.   
Loosely-coupled systems have less tight or fewer links between their parts, so 
they are able to absorb failures or unplanned behaviour without 
destabilization.   
A loosely-coupled system allows some ‘play’ in the system stabilizing (negative) 
feedback loops—a little over correction, followed by some under correction.  Loose 
systems are more adaptable, have more tolerance for error, but can have much 
longer reaction times.  If what happens in one part has little impact on another part, 
or if everything happens slowly, eg on the scale of human thinking times, the system 
is not tightly-coupled.  Loosely-coupled systems tend to be open and continually 
interacting with the outside environment. 
 
A tightly-coupled design generally uses traditional engineering methods, with bits of 
electronic kit, aircraft construction, software, etc.  Tightly-coupled systems can 
survive failures, but only if that kind of failure has been anticipated and provided for 
in the original design.  Designers of tightly-coupled systems must therefore invest 
effort and thought into anticipating failure modes and providing safety features to 
permit survival and recovery.  In contrast, loosely-coupled systems tend 
accommodate failures through adaptive responses.   
 
Perrow’s particular concern is with safety-critical systems that have both interactive 
complexity and tight coupling.  In such systems, an apparently trivial incident can 
potentially cascade in unpredictable ways that cannot be remedied, and hence 
produce severe consequences.  However, as is made very clear in Marais et al 
(2004), ATM does not in fact fall into this Perrow category.  In general, much of ATM 
system design is deliberately de-coupled in order to increase safety.  In particular, 
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large minimum separations are planned between aircraft, so that mistakes by 
controllers can be remedied; hence loosely-coupled.  This is in a system containing 
independent and engineering-redundant safety defensive layers (Brooker, 2002).   
 
Some sub-systems of the ATM system are designed to be tightly-coupled.  The 
operation of these kinds of tightly-coupled designs can usually be modelled 
quantitatively.  These models can be validated against what happens in the real 
world.  Thus, the sub-system acts in a ‘programmable’ or routine fashion (with 
specific designated functions).  The key element is that the range of expressed 
‘failure modes’ is comparatively limited and well defined. 
 
These kinds of approximately tightly-coupled systems would include navigation of 
well-defined route systems, vertical separation and ILS.  In such cases, Human 
Factors ‘failures’ need to be sufficiently regular in nature to permit a simple accident 
model to be used, ie of expression E form.  For example, it may be possible to 
measure the frequency of a straightforward error in inputting the correct data into an 
aircraft computer and put this in the model as a DEF rate.   
 
In contrast, loosely-coupled ATM sub-systems would include the pilot flying the 
aircraft away from airport runways and ATC/pilot interactions in sectors.  Loosely-
coupled ATM designs use much more complex information sources.  For example, 
the controller’s job requires visualization and situational awareness skills.   
 
Figure 9, taken from Brooker (2005), shows, in a very abstract and simplified 
fashion, the transit of a typical flight in ATM system terms.  The three pre-operational 
– Planning – layers have been grouped together because they are highly related, eg 
separation minima depend on suitable equipment being available, while the 
controller has to work within the safety constraints using the equipment.  The 
Operation Layers cover the activities of pilots and controllers while the flight is in 
progress.  The Alert Layer is the ground and air protection enabled by STCA and 
ACAS, on which the controller/pilot will act.  (The figure ignores the reality of 
complex feedback loops.) 
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Figure 9. The ATM system layers – highly simplified, without ‘loops’ 
But what do these layers actually accomplish in terms of system risks?  The answer 
is that they act systematically to reduce mid-air collision risk.  The purpose of the 
system layers is to reduce the ‘end product risk’.  A formal structure is imposed by 
the Planning Layers, next the Operation Layer should eliminate inherent conflicts 
(but note that the Planning Layer does not produce conflict free paths from departure 
to landing), and then the Alert Layer warns the controller and pilot about impending 
conflicts.  Thus, the risk arrow in the diagram should shrink at every stage; in other 
words, each defensive layer scales down the probability of a potentially hazardous 
situation.   
 
This is the only kind of quantitative risk model that is practically feasible for a loosely-
coupled sub-system (or Accident Type category).  An attempt at PSA will fail for the 
same reasons already noted: too many options, too large a potential for adaptive 
response and flexibility, and too many probabilities to estimate.  Loosely-coupled 
sub-systems have ‘slack’ in time or space, and the potential kinds of HF interaction 
are many in number.  This also means that an attempt at a ‘precise’ CRM will also 
fail – too few of the CRM conditions will be met.   
 
It is possible to carry out risk calculations for some loosely-coupled accident Types.  
Examples are Brooker (2002, 2003, 2004a).  The basic idea is to use selected 
Airprox data as indicating a DEF rate and then scale down by density and aircraft 
flightpath geometry.  There are obvious issues: what is an appropriate set of 
Airproxes?  Could under-reporting be a major problem?  Is enough known about the 
geometries and relative velocities of the aircraft at closest approach?   
 
These factors all tend to degrade the precision of the estimate, making it both rough 
and probably pessimistic if a sequence of cautious modelling assumptions has had 
to be made.  One way of dealing with this is to include specific factors for the 
beneficial effects of STCA and ACAS.  The policy implications of this are discussed 
in Brooker (2005a) (in particular the section on Risk Assessment Over-pessimism).  
The key point is that, if the defensive barrier benefits of STCA/ACAS are excluded 
from ATM system safety calculations, then this puts an extra burden on risk 
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estimation, in that the calculations will tend to be unjustifiably over-pessimistic about 
the value of new concepts.   
 
Safety for loosely-coupled operational systems is improved – purportedly “to meet 
safety targets” – by an on-going process of safety feedback plus the introduction of 
additional safety-related defensive layers and engineering redundancies, eg GPWS, 
STCA, ACAS, error-free FMCS databases, etc.  The key thing to ensure safety is 
that the rest of the ATM safety layers described above work effectively enough to 
produce the necessary corrective action.  For example, there is a need to focus 
attention on circumstances and geometries when STCA and ACAS do not provide 
large amounts of extra protection or when the geometries/velocities mean that they 
induce risk. 
 
To summarise the key features of called tightly- and loosely-coupled models in the 
present context:  
Tightly-coupled models – accident risk is a function of specific failures, eg 
gross navigational errors or a restricted set of Human Factor failures occurring 
comparatively regularly.  Risk can be numerically quantified in terms of a 
limited number of key failure modes using CRM.   
Loosely-coupled models – safety is provided through a structure of defensive 
layers: risks occur if these layers perform poorly and do not filter out 
potentially hazardous situations.  Risk can only be roughly numerically 
quantified, based on past defensive layer performance. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Some important questions are posed here about ATM safety, including: What do 
design safety targets really mean and imply for risk modelling?  In what 
circumstances can future accident risk really be modelled with sufficient precision?  If 
risk cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic 
growth and operational/technical changes?   
 
These questions have been addressed by an analysis of the nature of accidents, 
causal factors and practical collision risk modelling.  The underlying theme is how 
best to combine sound safety evidence and real-world hazard analysis in a coherent 
and systematic framework.   
 
The essential ingredients for answering the questions – a mental toolkit – include: 
• Clarity about the nature of a safe ATM System, which is much more than the 
provision of a ground based ATC service, eg includes regulatory factors.   
• Rationale for accident Types and probability of occurrence. 
• Concept of ‘NESS causes’ describing causation of different accident Types. 
• Tendency for the number of NESS causes in accidents to increase over time, 
because of improvements and added safety defences. 
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• General theory of collision risk modelling, based on gross flightpath deviations 
(DEF) and recovery from ‘reasonable intent’ flightpaths (RIF), noting that 
these can occur at different stages in ATM system phases.  . 
• Analysis of the inherent difficulty in mapping causes with large human factor 
components onto measurable gross deviations. 
• Evidence that PSA/HRA will generally be unsuccessful in estimating ATM 
risks. 
• Criteria for collision risk modelling to provide estimates with usable precision. 
• Distinction between loosely- versus tightly-coupled ATM system models, with 
examples of approximate collision risk models based on Airprox data. 
An important conclusion is that there are intrinsic limits to circumstances where 
realistic quantitative modelling is feasible.  For increased coverage by such models, 
a number of criteria would have to be met, eg in terms of the data recording of gross 
deviations from the intended flightpath. 
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